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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are often deployed in
hostile environments for specific applications from mobile
objects monitoring to data collecting. By eavesdropping the
sensor nodes’ transmissions and tracing the packets’ tra-
jectories in the WSNs, an adversary can capture the loca-
tion of a source or sink eventually. Thus, the location pri-
vacy of both source and sink becomes a significant issue in
WSNs. Previous research only focuses on the location pri-
vacy of the source or sink independently. In this paper, we
address the importance of location privacy of both source
and sink and propose four schemes to protect them simul-
taneously. Simulation results illustrate the effectiveness of
our proposed schemes.
Keywords: Location Privacy; Secure Routing; Wireless
Sensor Networks.
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are made up of a num-
ber of sensor nodes that are self-organized to carry out tasks
such as mobile objects monitoring and environmental sens-
ing. Because they use wireless communications, which can
be accessed by anyone who wishes, it is not difficult to at-
tack wireless networks with the goal of either obtaining con-
fidential data or simply disrupting the normal operation of
the WSNs [1]. In either case, they may involve threats to
one of two types of WSN privacy, content privacy and con-
textual privacy [2]. The content privacy refers to the con-
fidentiality of the content of the packets passing between
the nodes in the network. This is usually guaranteed by us-
ing methods of encryption and authentication [3]. The con-
textual privacy refers to the confidentiality of information
about traffic patterns in the network, which attackers may
use to disrupt the network. The location privacy, which is
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Figure 1. Location privacy sensitive scenario.
the confidentiality of the location of either source or sink
nodes, is a kind of the contextual privacy.
To illustrate how information about traffic patterns in a
network might be exploited by an adversary, consider the
scenario of “panda-hunter” [2] in Figure 1, which shows
a typical WSN where sensor nodes monitor the pandas in
the environment and then send report packets to a sink by
multi-hop wireless communications. There is a central con-
troller (sink in Figure 1) and several pandas in the monitor-
ing field. The sensor nodes which monitor the pandas will
act as the source nodes and they will report the monitored
information to the central controller via WSN periodically.
The scenario is obvious unsafe as the hunter (adversary in
Figure 1) is easily able to either locate a source by back
tracing hop-by-hop to capture the panda or locate a receiver
by following the flow of packets in the network to destroy
the central controller, which will make the whole system
crash. The challenge in the scenario is essentially to pro-
tect the end-to-end location privacy rather than merely the
source or sink location privacy. Thus, the end-to-end loca-
tion privacy protection becomes one of the most important
contextual privacy problems in the WSNs.
Lots of location privacy routing techniques in WSNs
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have been developed in the past decade. However, these
proposed techniques can only protect the source location
privacy or the sink location privacy independently. In this
paper we propose four end-to-end location privacy protec-
tion techniques to protect against a local eavesdropper who
might breach the location privacy of a source or sink, that
is, end-to-end location privacy. The four schemes are for-
ward random walk, bidirectional tree, dynamic bidirectional
tree and zigzag bidirectional tree. In the forward random
walk approach, every node relays a received packet to a
node randomly chosen from its forward neighbors whose
hop-count to the sink is no larger than its own. This proce-
dure is repeated at each node until the packet arrives at the
sink. To increase the location anonymity, tree topology is
employed at the two ends of the routing path respectively
in the bidirectional tree scheme. In the dynamic bidirec-
tional tree scheme, branches of the trees are generated dy-
namically which can improve the performance. However,
in the bidirectional tree scheme, real messages routed along
a shortest path, which makes it possible for an eavesdrop-
per to infer the location of the source and sink by extending
the line of the shortest path. To solve this potential threat,
a proxy source and a proxy sink are devised in the zigzag
bidirectional tree scheme, making it more difficult for the
adversary to obtain the location of the source and sink.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows:
• We address the importance of simultaneously protect-
ing the location privacy of both source and sink;
• We propose four privacy routing schemes to preserve
the end-to-end location privacy against a local eaves-
dropper;
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
schemes with simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews the existing privacy routing techniques. Sec-
tion III describes the system scenario and the adversary
model. Section IV describes our proposed four privacy rout-
ing schemes. Section V evaluates the performance of the
proposed schemes under the TOSSIM platform. Finally,
Section VI concludes this paper and puts forward the future
work.
2 Related Work
Many techniques have been proposed for the protection
of the source location privacy in WSNs. [2] and [4] have
proposed a source location privacy scheme that makes use
of the Panda-Hunter problem as an application scenario
for monitoring-oriented sensor networks where the loca-
tion privacy is important. The Phantom routing protocol
makes use of a random walk to prevent attackers from iden-
tifying the source. Xi et al. [5] have proposed a two-way
random walk routing protocol (from both source and sink)
called greedy random walk which can reduce the opportu-
nity for an eavesdropper to collect the location information.
PRLA [6] protects the source location privacy by using so-
called inclination angles to ensure that every random walk
gets away from the region close to the source, which en-
hances the source location privacy. In [7], loops are gen-
erated in the network. The adversary has to go around
these loops, thereby being led away from the real path,
which guarantees high privacy. A suboptimal privacy rout-
ing scheme called WRS has been proposed in [8] to protect
the source location privacy by distributing message flows
to different disjoint routes. It also formulates the perfor-
mance bound for any routing scheme. Jian et al. [9] pro-
tect the source location privacy through a two-phase rout-
ing process. In the first phase, the packet travels randomly
through the intermediate nodes before it is routed to a ring
node. Then the packet is mixed with other packets through a
network mixing ring (NMR). In [10] two techniques called
periodic collection and source simulation are proposed. In
the periodic collection, every node sends messages periodi-
cally, making the network n-anonymous. In the source sim-
ulation, it provides trade-offs between privacy, communica-
tion cost and latency. Four schemes named naive, global,
greedy and probabilistic are proposed in [11] to provide lo-
cation privacy against a laptop-class attack. Yang et al. [12]
propose to use proxies to protect the source location of an
event. A prototype of the scheme is implemented on Mica2
motes. In [13] FitProbRate is proposed, which first adopts
the statistically strong source anonymity to reduce the la-
tency efficiently.
Sink location privacy has also been well studied. In [14],
Deng et al. have proposed a base station privacy scheme
against the traffic-rate analysis attack that randomly delays
the transmission time of each packet. They have also pro-
posed in [15] to defend against the traffic analysis attacks
by using multi-path routing and fake message injection to
hide the location of the base station. LPR [16] provides the
receiver location privacy against the packet tracing attacks.
In LPR, the message flows incoming from and outgoing to
a sensor node are uniformly distributed, which makes it dif-
ficult for an adversary to ascertain the direction of the sink.
Moreover, LPR injects fake messages into the network to
get a longer safety period.
However, the common drawback of all these approaches
is that they only consider the location privacy of the source
or sink independently, while it is particular important to pro-
tect the location privacy of both simultaneously for some
application scenarios such as the one illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. In this paper, we aim to combine the protection of
the source location privacy and the sink location privacy to-
gether. Thus, four end-to-end location privacy protection
techniques against the local eavesdropper are proposed in
this paper.
3 Problem Statement
In this section, we will describe a generic scenario in
which a WSN is potentially threatened by a particular ad-
versary, where the adversary seeks to breach the location
privacy of a source or sink in the network. After that we
will introduce the adversary model in detail.
We consider a scenario where a WSN is deployed for
pandas monitoring. The WSN is comprised of a sink node
and many sensor nodes among which the packets flow from
certain source nodes to the sink. As the WSN is poten-
tially threatened by a particular adversary, where the ad-
versary seeks to breach the location privacy of a source or
sink in the network, it is equally important to protect the lo-
cation privacy of the sources and sink simultaneously. We
use the arrangement illustrated in Figure 1, the sensor nodes
which monitor the pandas (stationary or nomadic), will act
as sources and periodically send reports of their surveil-
lance to a static central controller. Routing strategies are
demanded to protect the location privacy of the pandas and
the central controller, i.e., the sources and the sink.
We assume that all the sensor nodes are identically con-
figured, thus, they have the same capability and communi-
cation range r. Two sensor nodes can communicate with
each other when their distance is less than r. The sink is
assumed to have greater capabilities than the sensor nodes.
During the initialization phase of the network, the sink orig-
inates a flooding, which provides each sensor node three
kinds of information: 1) the least hop count from itself to
the sink; 2) its neighboring nodes; 3) the least hop count
from each neighboring node to the sink. During the report
period Tr, each source sends a packet to the sink periodi-
cally with an interval of TS using certain routing strategies.
The location privacy of sources and sink are regarded as in-
tact if none of them can be identified by the adversary within
Tr.
We assume attackers to be equipped with some power-
ful devices that can be used to locate the sender of a trans-
mitted packet. Attackers can also move freely in the net-
work. Typically, attackers against the contextual privacy are
of two classes: local (or mote-class) attackers and global (or
laptop-class) attackers [17]. Local attackers are assumed to
have a local view of the network traffic, which means that
they can only eavesdrop on the packets within the trans-
mission range. Global attackers acquire a global view of
the network traffic, based on which they can intercept every
packet in the network. The global attackers have serious ef-
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Figure 2. The adversary eavesdrops on pack-
ets in the network.
fects on the network but they are very difficult to implement,
especially in a large scale wireless sensor network. In this
paper, we focus on the location privacy protection of both
source and sink against the local adversary.
We assume that each message transmitted in the net-
work is encrypted and the adversary cannot access the con-
tent. Thus, a local adversary is reduced to identifying ei-
ther source (or sink) by analyzing the traffic flow and trac-
ing back (or forth) hop-by-hop. We define the character-
istics of a local adversary as follows, some of which are
borrowed from the “panda-hunter” model [2]: 1) The ad-
versary randomly walks in the network until it eavesdrops
a packet transmitted by some sensor node. The adversary
then randomly decides whether to trace the source (capture
the pandas) or sink (destroy the whole system). 2) The ad-
versary is equipped with powerful devices, such as antenna
and spectrum analyzer, which can be used to measure the
arriving angle and the received signal strength of a mes-
sage. Based on the above two measurements, the adversary
can identify the location of the immediate sender. 3) The
adversary is able to detect the target (the source or sink)
when it is close enough. 4) The movement of the adversary
is far slower than the transmitting speed of a packet in the
network. Therefore, the adversary can only trace the flow
by one hop for one packet transmission. 5) The adversary
will not actively interfere with the packet transmission in
the network as there may exist intrusion detection mecha-
nisms. 6) The adversary has enough memory space to save
the trace information, and if it receives no more packets for
some time, it may retreat to a previous location. 7) Accord-
ing to Kerckhoff’s Principle, the adversary is aware of the
routing strategies of the network.
An adversary can initially move around and wait for
eavesdropping a message. As soon as it detects a new
packet, it can determine the location of the immediate
sender for tracing the source. It can then move to that lo-
cation and wait there for the next packet. To trace the sink,
the adversary needs to identify the direction of the packet
and then moves to the receiver of the packet. In Figure 2
for example, the adversary stays at node B. If the adversary
wants to trace the source, it will move to node A as soon
as node A transmits a packet to node B. On the other hand,
if the adversary wants to trace the sink, it can identify the
direction of the packet as follows: It detects a packet trans-
mitted from node A when node A sends a packet to node B.
Shortly after that, node B transmits a packet and soon again
after node C transmits a packet. The adversary identifies
the transmission sequence A→B→C and node C is the last
receiver. The adversary then moves to node C.
In this paper we assume that the adversary behaves ac-
cording to one of two models: the patient adversary model
and the cautious adversary model. In both models, the ad-
versary first randomly walks and detects packets in the net-
work. As soon as it detects a packet, it triggers a hop-by-
hop tracing procedure to capture either the source or the
sink. In the patient adversary model, the adversary will use
the above technique patiently until it captures its target, i.e.,
the source or sink. In the cautious adversary model, the
adversary will trace back if it waits for a given period at
some location. We define the path that the adversary visited
as V = {v1, v2, ..., vl−1, vl}, where vl is the current location
of the adversary. When the adversary has not received any
new packet within a specific interval at vl, it will trace back
along V to vl−1, delete vl in V and then wait there for new
packet. We define the set of locations that the adversary
has visited and traced back as F. To avoid invalid tracing,
when the adversary traces back from vl to vl−1, it will add
vl into F, and ignore packets coming from any location in
F. Also, the adversary can avoid getting lost in a loop with
loop detection techniques.
4 Location Privacy Protection Techniques
The location privacy is vulnerable when the packets
travel from source to sink since the adversary can trace the
source or sink by monitoring the packets flow in the net-
work. Thus, the primary purpose of privacy routing pro-
tocols is to protect the location privacy of both the source
and sink during the report period Tr. This section describes
our proposed four routing schemes for protecting the end-
to-end location privacy: forward random walk, bidirectional
tree, dynamic bidirectional tree and zigzag bidirectional tree
schemes.
4.1 Forward Random Walk Scheme
In the sample network in Figure 1, the source periodi-
cally sends packets to the sink by multi-hop wireless com-
munications during the report period Tr. If the packets al-
ways travel from the source to the sink along a fixed route,
it will be easy for an adversary to capture either the source
or the sink via hop-by-hop tracing. Therefore, a solution
to achieve end-to-end location privacy is to randomize the
routing path, based on which we propose the forward ran-
dom walk scheme (FRW).
The FRW requires all the nodes in the network to obtain
their hop counts to the sink, which can be achieved using a
sink-based flooding. At the end of the flooding, each node
can get both its own and its neighbors’ hop counts to the
sink. Let the hop count of node i be Hi, then it satisfies
|Hi − H j| ≤ 1, where node j is a neighbor of node i and H j
is the hop count of node j.
In the FRW scheme, every node divides its neighbors
into three lists, further list, equivalent list and closer list.
Each neighbor in the further list has a larger hop count
than the sender, while each neighbor in the closer list has a
smaller hop count than itself. The node’ equivalent list con-
sists of neighbors that have the same hop count with itself.
The combination of the equivalent list and closer list forms
the forward list. When forwarding a packet, the node will
randomly select a neighbor from its forward list as the next
hop. Neighbors in the further list will not be considered as
the candidates for the next hop since they will remarkably
increase the latency. Consequently, the packet will be ran-
domly forwarded from source to sink.
The FRW scheme protects the end-to-end location pri-
vacy by randomizing the routing path. However, its latency
will be large since the forward random walk lengthens the
routing path. Furthermore, the FRW scheme relays packets
only to the neighbors in the forward list, resulting in that it
can not obtain a high location privacy. A method to achieve
a high location privacy is to inject dummy messages into the
network. We define the real messages as the report packets
transmitted from the source to sink and the dummy mes-
sages are the packets with no useful content and they are
generated to draw the adversary away from the actual path.
4.2 Bidirectional Tree Scheme
In the hostile network, as the adversary can threaten the
location privacy of the source or sink by monitoring the
packets flow, an effective idea to defend against the threat is
to let the source and sink hide in the branches of a tree topol-
ogy, which requires the adversary to consume more time on
discovering them. Therefore, we employ the tree topology
in the BT scheme to protect the end-to-end location privacy.
Figure 3 shows the main idea of the BT scheme. The real
messages travel along the shortest path from the source to
the sink. To protect the source location privacy, branches
are designed along the shortest path in the source side, in
which the dummy messages travel from the leaf nodes to
the stalk nodes. As the adversary would trace the source
by moving backward the direction of the packets, it makes
the adversary deviate from the real path, which can protect
the source location privacy. Similarly, the branches along
the shortest path in the sink side are designed to protect the
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Figure 3. The scenario for the bidirectional
tree scheme.
sink location privacy. The dummy messages in the branches
travel from the stalk nodes to the leaf nodes, which can draw
the adversary away from the real path to protect the sink lo-
cation privacy since the adversary would trace the sink by
moving forward the direction of the packets.
Initially, the sink originates a flooding such that each
node can obtain the hop count to the sink. Before sending
report messages to the sink, the source generates a routing
request message including its hop count Hs and sends it to
the sink along the shortest path. For each node who receives
the routing request message, if its hop count to the sink is
larger than (1 − α2 )Hs, it will randomly select a neighbor
with probability P to generate a branch, where α is the per-
centage of the nodes on the shortest path that generate the
tree branches to protect the location privacy of the source
or sink. Meanwhile, for each node who receives the routing
request message and its hop count is less than α2 Hs, it will
randomly select a neighbor with probability P to generate a
branch, which can protect the sink location privacy.
For instance, if α = 2/3, each node on the shortest path
with a hop count larger than 23 Hs will originate a branch
with probability P to protect the source location privacy.
Each node on the shortest path with a hop count less than
1
3 Hs will also originate a branch with probability P to pro-
tect the sink location privacy. The nodes in-between just
relay the routing request message along the shortest path to
the sink.
The dummy messages in the branches can entice the ad-
versary to get away from the real path. Thus, the BT scheme
can obtain a high location privacy against a local eaves-
dropper. However, there is still a potential threat in the BT
scheme. As shown in Figure 3, the adversary may be mis-
led, getting lost in the path between A and the source or
in the path between B and the sink. However, a powerful
adversary may infer the direction of the target based on its
visited path V (as mentioned in the adversary model). If
the adversary is searching for the source when it is near to
B. As the real messages travel along the shortest path, the
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Figure 4. The scenario for the dynamic bidi-
rectional tree scheme.
adversary can trace hop-by-hop from B to A. Then the ad-
versary can infer that the source should be on the extending
line of BA. Thus, the adversary can move directly along BA
from A and it can identify the source as soon as it gets close
enough with a high probability. The adversary can also use
the same strategy to infer the direction of the sink.
4.3 Dynamic Bidirectional Tree Scheme
To prevent the adversary from inferring the direction of
the source or sink as mentioned above, the dynamic bidi-
rectional tree (DBT) scheme combines the FRW scheme
and the BT scheme. Figure 4 shows the main idea of the
DBT scheme. The paths for the real message vary over
time, which greatly increases the tracing difficulty for the
adversary as it prevents the adversary from inferring the di-
rection of the target.
Initially, the sink triggers a flooding such that each node
can get its hop count to the sink. During the report period
Tr in which the source periodically sends reporting pack-
ets to the sink by multi-hop wireless communications, each
node who receives the reporting packet will randomly se-
lect a neighbor from its forward list to forward the received
reporting packet. Therefore, the real messages travel with a
forward random walk mode from source to sink.
To protect the source location privacy, a dynamic tree
topology will be adopted. Assume that the hop count of the
source is Hs. When a node i receives a real message from
its neighbor j, it will forward the real message to the next
hop, which is randomly selected from its forward list. Also,
if its hop count is larger than Hs/2 but smaller than H j, it
will generate a source side’s branch with probability P us-
ing a method similar to that in the BT scheme. The essential
difference is that each fake source will only send L dummy
messages. Otherwise, if its hop count is smaller than both
Hs/2 and H j, it will generate a sink side’s branch with prob-
ability P using a method similar to that in the BT scheme.
The difference is that when a node receives a dummy mes-
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Figure 5. The scenario for the zigzag bidirec-
tional tree scheme. Concentric circle A rep-
resents a proxy source and B represents a
proxy sink.
sage, it will reselect a child node to relay this dummy mes-
sage.
4.4 Zigzag Bidirectional Tree Scheme
The zigzag bidirectional tree scheme (ZBT) is another
location privacy protection scheme we propose to prevent
the adversary from inferring the direction of the source or
sink. In the ZBT, the proxy source and the proxy sink are
employed. The real messages travel along three segments:
from the source to the proxy source, from the proxy source
to the proxy sink and from the proxy sink to the real sink.
As shown in Figure 5, concentric circle A represents a proxy
source and B represents a proxy sink. In the path from
source to A, there will be tree branches to lead the adver-
sary away from the real path. From A to B, the packets will
travel along the shortest path. And in the path from B to
the sink, there will also be tree branches to protect the sink
location privacy.
To guarantee the effectiveness of the ZBT scheme, two
proxy sink candidates are generated, which are deployed at
the two opposite sides of the sink. Otherwise, if only one
proxy sink candidate exists and the source is very close to
this proxy sink, then the branches on the source side will be
invalid in protecting the source location privacy. As shown
in Figure 6, if the source is close to proxy sink B and proxy
sink B is selected as the proxy sink, then the path from the
source to proxy source and the path from proxy source to
proxy sink B will be very close to each other, it will be
vulnerable if the adversary traces from proxy sink B to cap-
ture the source as the source is close to proxy sink B. Thus,
we can generate two candidates on the two opposite sides of
the sink as the proxy sink nodes. We can make the distances
between the sink and the proxies approximate to hr, which
makes the hop count from each proxy sink to the sink prox-
imate to h. The sink and the two proxy sink nodes initiate
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Figure 6. Proxy sink and proxy source selec-
tion for zigzag bidirectional tree scheme.
flooding so that the hop counts to each of them can be ob-
tained by every node in the network. As the zigzag routing
will be invalid if the proxy sink is close to the source, the
source will always select the candidate further away from
itself as the proxy sink (Proxy sink A is selected in Fig-
ure. 6). To determine the source proxy, the source can initi-
ate a h-hops flooding. Before delivering the report packets
to the sink, the source will select a node which is h hops
away from itself as the source proxy. Note that the proxy
source should be carefully selected to make the path from
the source to proxy source away from the sink, making the
sink safe when the adversary traces along this path.
Similar to the BT scheme, as shown in Figure 5, when
the reporting packet travels between the source and proxy
source, each node in the path will generate a branch with
probability P and TTL of L. When the report packet travels
from proxy sink to the sink, it will also generate a branch
with probability P and TTL of L. The real packet will travel
along the shortest path from the proxy source to the proxy
sink and no branch will be generated on this path.
5 Performance Evaluation
We implement our proposed end-to-end location privacy
protection schemes on TOSSIM platform to illustrate their
effectiveness. The topology of the network is generated by
uniformly deploying 3000 sensor nodes within a rectangu-
lar area of 30 × 100. The communication range of each
sensor node is 1.67. The average number of neighbor for a
node is 8.76. We evaluate our proposed schemes in term of
safety period which begins from the moment the adversary
triggers the tracing procedure (i.e., detects the first packet)
and ends at the moment when the adversary identifies the
source or sink. It is measured using the ratio of the time
period before the adversary identifies the source or sink to
the length of interval Ts. Two different adversary models,
i.e., the patient adversary model and the cautious adversary
model are considered in the simulations.
The parameter settings are as follows: Each node who
relays the real packet has the probability P = 0.8 to generate
a branch, the length of each branch is L = 10. α is set as 1
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Figure 7. Safety period of the source location
privacy under patient adversary model.
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Figure 8. Safety period of the sink location
privacy under patient adversary model.
for the BT scheme, and in the ZBT scheme, the hop count
of the proxy source to the source is h = 15.
Figure 7 shows the safety period of the source location
privacy under the patient adversary model. It is obvious that
the ZBT scheme achieves the highest safety period. The
safety period of the BT scheme increases rapidly as the hop
count increases. When the hop count is larger than 30, the
safety period of the BT scheme gets close to that of the ZBT
scheme. The safety period of the FRW and DBT schemes
are relatively low, and the DBT scheme slightly outperforms
the FRW scheme.
In Figure 8, the safety period of the sink location privacy
under the patient adversary model is shown. As the adver-
sary has to determine the direction of the packet before it
moves to the receiver, which is more time-consuming for
the adversary, under the patient adversary model, the safety
period of sink location privacy is larger than that of source
location privacy. We can find that the ZBT scheme outper-
forms other schemes. When the hop count is larger than 15,
10 15 20 25 30 35
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Hop counts from source to sink
S
a
fe
ty
 P
e
ri
o
d
 
 
Forward random walk
Bidirectional tree
Dynamic bidirectional tree
Zigzag bidirectional tree
Figure 9. Safety period of the source location
privacy under cautious adversary model.
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Figure 10. Safety period of the sink location
privacy under cautious adversary model.
the safety period of the ZBT, BT and FRW scheme tends to
be larger than 200, indicating a high sink location privacy.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate that under the patient adver-
sary model, the DBT scheme cannot achieve a high location
privacy.
Under the cautious adversary model, the safety period
of the source location privacy of our proposed schemes is
shown in Figure 9. The safety period of source location
privacy under the cautious adversary is lower than that un-
der the patient adversary model. The reason is that the
cautious adversary is smarter and when it waits for a long
time at some location, it is able to trace back to avoid be-
ing drawn away by some dummy messages. When the hop
count equals to 10, the ZBT scheme obtains the highest
safety period. However, the DBT scheme outperforms other
schemes when the hop count is larger than 15. The safety
period of all the schemes increases with the increase of hop
count. However, the increase ratio of the ZBT scheme is
the least. Thus, when the hop is larger than 30, the FRW
scheme outperforms the ZBT scheme. The performance of
the BT scheme is always the worst.
Figure 10 illustrates the safety period of the sink loca-
tion privacy under the cautious adversary model. Com-
pared to the sink location privacy under the patient adver-
sary model, the safety period is lower under the cautious
adversary model as the adversary has higher capacity. The
FRW scheme achieves the highest performance while the
BT scheme has the lowest safety period. As it is more time-
consuming for the adversary to capture the sink than the
source, when under the cautious adversary model, the safety
period of the sink location privacy is also larger than that of
the source location privacy.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
The end-to-end location privacy is an important issue in
WSNs. In this paper, we address the necessity of simulta-
neously protecting the location privacy of both the source
and sink for a typical application. We propose four pri-
vacy routing schemes, forward random walk, bidirectional
tree, dynamic bidirectional tree and zigzag bidirectional
tree, against a local eavesdropper, to obtain the end-to-end
location privacy. We also implement the proposed privacy
routing schemes on the TOSSIM platform, and evaluate the
performance in term of safety period. The simulation re-
sults illustrate that our proposed location privacy protection
schemes can obtain satisfied performance.
Since each of our proposed schemes obtains different
performance on protecting the source location privacy or
sink location privacy, we, as the future work, plan to decom-
pose our proposed schemes and deeply analyze the effects
of each one on the source location privacy and sink location
privacy respectively. We will then design an optimal combi-
nation from these decomposed schemes to achieve a highest
location privacy protection for both ends.
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